Majority ethnonationalist ethnic riot and protest in 18 European countries: Variable levels of vote salience
Brandon Ives
forthcoming at Party Politics

​Commodity price shocks and ethnic riots:  Evidence from a new dataset on majority ethnic nationalist organizations
Brandon Ives
forthcoming at Journal of Peace Research

When conflict meets political exclusion: Ethnicity, governance, and child mortality 
Soyun Chang, Brandon Ives & Jieun Oh
SSM-Population Health

Perceived threat and demographic misperception
Brandon Ives & Jori Breslawski
Politics and Religion, 1-14

Repression, backlash, and the duration of protests in Africa
Jacob S Lewis & Brandon Ives
Journal of Peace Research, 62(1), 21-35

Within ethnic population inequality and within self-determination movement violence
Brandon Ives
Defence and Peace Economics, 35(8), 1009-1027​

Movement under state and non-state authorities during COVID-19: Evidence from Lebanon
Jori Breslawski & Brandon Ives
SSM-Population Health, 19, 101157

Greed, grievance, or graduates? Why do men rebel?
Brandon Ives & Jori Breslawski
Journal of Peace Research, 59(3), 319-336

Trickledown politics: Do excluded ethnic groups benefit from non-violent national resistance campaigns?
Brandon Ives
Conflict Management and Peace Science, 39(6), 661-685
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From rallies to riots: Why some protests become violent
Brandon Ives & Jacob S Lewis
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 64(5), 958-986

Religious institutionalism: A domestic explanation for external support of rebel groups
Brandon Ives
International Interactions, 45(4), 693-719

Ethnic external support and rebel group splintering
Brandon Ives
Terrorism and Political Violence, 33(7), 1546-1566

Killing for god? Factional violence on the transnational stage
Brandon Ives & Jori Breslawski 
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 63(3), 617-643

Working Articles

Islamist Protests Against Israel in Muslim-Majority Countries: Grievance Competition, Economic Shocks, and Protest History, under review
Why do some Islamist organizations in Muslim-majority countries protest against Israel while others remain silent? This study examines variation in transnational anti-war protests targeting Israel across 389 Islamist organizations in Muslim majority countries during three major conflicts involving Israel (2006, 2008–09, 2014). It theorizes a grievance competition framework, arguing that conflict-driven grievances alone are insufficient to spur protest against Israel. Instead, domestic economic conditions and an organization’s prior protest behavior jointly condition the likelihood of protest against Israel. Using original data and a research design comparing pre- and post-conflict protest activity, the study finds that economic upturns – measured through changes in export prices – are associated with increased protest against Israel, but only among organizations with a history of protest. These findings challenge existing findings that economic hardship drive mobilization and contribute to research on transnational anti-war protests, political Islam, and the interaction of economic and political grievances.

Transnational religion and foreign-directed protests in India and Pakistan’, w/Abhisheka Dubey and Jieun Oh, under review
This study investigates protests against Pakistan that occur in India and protests against India occurring in Pakistan, which we term foreign-directed protests. Existing studies on protests and transnational issues prioritize protests across multiple countries that target international institutions or climate-related issues, limiting analysis of foreign-directed protests and the possible role of transnational religious ties. This study theorizes that transnational religious ties and the conditions of co-religious minorities in other countries may drive foreign-directed protests. Specifically, violence against co-religious minorities in the other country is expected to drive foreign-directed protests, and the effect is theorized to be stronger during periods of heightened domestic political competition. Using Armed Conflict Location & Event Data at the first administrative district level in India and Pakistan, negative binomial regression with random intercepts demonstrates foreign-directed protests relate to the extent of violence against the co-religious minority in the other country, particularity when political competition is high. The findings advance studies on transnational religion and its relationship with domestic politics and populism, as well as studies on India-Pakistan bilateral ties.
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Rebel Threat, Government Tactics, and Deaths from Hunger in Civil War, w/Paul Huth and Peter White, under review
It is widely understood that mass hunger often has war as a root cause. Yet only a minority of wars lead to deaths from hunger. In this article, we examine deaths from hunger in civil wars and argue that what separates wars that lead to deaths from hunger from those that do not is the extent of rebel threat. When facing severe threats in the form of large rebel groups or major casualties, government forces are more likely to resort to aggressive counterinsurgency strategies that either directly target civilians or cause high levels of collateral damage. These tactical choices disrupt livelihoods and food production and create large refugee populations that are vulnerable to malnutrition, leading to deaths from hunger. We test this theory using new data we have collected on incidence of hunger-related deaths during civil wars and find strong support for our theoretical expectations.

When does repression generate backlash? w/Jacob S. Lewis and William Favell, in preparation
When do government repressive efforts backfire, producing large backlash events in protest of the original lockdown? A substantial body of research has examined the role of government repression in generating backlash, but studies have produced contrasting results. Some studies find that repression does generate backlash, while others find that it does not. Understanding the relationship between repression and backlash is a critical question in a time when citizens around the world are actively taking to the streets to protest democratic backsliding. We develop a theory about when we should expect repression to deter dissent and when it should generate backlash. Using data from 57 African countries, we test our theory and find that, consistent with the broader literature, backlash is most likely when grievances are high, resources are available, and political opportunities are open. We also find important temporal effects; immediate backlash responses are systematically different from those occurring within 1 month of a repressive event.

The interaction of neighbor and country dissent and subnational variation in repression, w/Jacob S. Lewis, in preparation
Despite global improvements in reducing repression levels, government repression of protests in a number of African countries remains a pressing concern.  In response, researchers have provided insight into subnational variation in repression of protests and riots, which we refer to as reactive repression. This study advances existing insights by examining how and whether reactive repression is responsive to extent of dissent in neighboring regions and at the national level.  Data from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project identify dissent and repression from 1997 to 2015 across 54 countries in Africa and are matched at the monthly level to 10,674 0.5 degree by 0.5 degree grid cells.  Each grid’s level of neighboring dissent and countrywide dissent rates in the previous month are then identified.  Linear regression with two-way fixed effects demonstrates that reactive repression in a locality associates positively with higher levels (1) of countrywide dissent, (2) neighboring dissent, and (3) the interaction of country and neighboring dissent.  Overall, our results indicate that governments engage in repression not simply based on neighboring dissent levels but on the broader dissent conditions occurring in the country, highlighting the multiplicative relationship between country and subnational factors.
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Transnational ethnicity and organizations advocating for the ethnic population in power, in preparation
Why do majority ethnic populations have varying numbers of political organizations making claims on behalf of that ethnicity?  This article posits that the number of majority ethnic nationalist (MEN) organizations is a function of grievances stemming from transnational ethnicity and discrepancies between ethnic and political boundaries.  Original data are collected that identify MEN organizations from a random selection of 90 countries from 1990 to 2017.  The number of MEN political organizations per capita is regressed (OLS) on two variables measuring transnational ethnicity:  the natural logarithm of the number of transnational ethnic kin and the level of ethnic fractionalization across state borders.  Results are similar for both measures.  Moving from the minimum to maximum values of the transnational ethnic kin number associates with a 153% increase in the logged number of MEN organizations per capita.  The results demonstrate that discrepancies between ethnic and political borders are meaningful for MEN political mobilization.