Breslawski, J., & Ives, B. (2022). Movement under state and non-state authorities during COVID-19: Evidence from Lebanon. SSM-Population Health. 101157.
Ives, B. & Breslawski, J. (2022). Greed, Grievance, or Graduates? Why do Men Rebel? Journal of Peace Research, 59(3), 319-336.
Ives, B. (2021). Trickledown politics: Do excluded ethnic groups benefit from non-violent national resistance campaigns?. Conflict Management and Peace Science, 07388942211045936.
Ives, B., & Lewis, J. S. (2020). From rallies to riots: Why some protests become violent. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 64(5), 958-986.
Ives, B. (2019). Religious institutionalism: a domestic explanation for external support of rebel groups. International Interactions, 45(4), 693-719.
Ives, B. (2021). Ethnic external support and rebel group splintering. Terrorism and Political Violence, 33(7), 1546-1566.
Breslawski, J., & Ives, B. (2019). Killing for god? Factional violence on the transnational stage. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 63(3), 617-643.
Manuscripts in preparation
'Commodity Price Shocks and Ethnic Population in Power Organization Ethnic Riot', in preparation
This study investigates the relationship between negative economic growth and ethnic population in power (EPP) organization ethnic riot. Studies on negative economic growth and ethnic violence focus primarily on out-of-power ethnic populations and civil war violence, devoting insufficient attention to EPP organizations and ethnic riots. This article introduces a novel dataset of yearly ethnic riot behavior of 907 EPP organizations from 90 randomly selected countries from 1990 to 2017. Using commodity terms of trade (CTOT) shocks as exogenous changes in national economic growth, OLS regression analysis demonstrates a systematic and substantive association between negative economic growth and EPP organization ethnic riot probability. Additional analysis demonstrates that negative CTOT shocks have a larger effect on EPP organizations that are not in a country’s governing coalition. Overall, the evidence demonstrates that negative economic growth is pivotal for declining inter-ethnic relations, and in particular, EPP organization ethnic riot.
'Transnational Grievances: Who Protests against Israel?', in preparation
This article investigates why some Islamist organizations in Muslim-majority countries protest against Israel but not others. Through mechanisms related to increased demand for protest against Israel among existing supporters, organization reputation costs, and greater recruitment possibilities, it hypothesizes that non-terrorist, pan-Islamist organizations will see higher increases in protest against Israel following Israel-related war outbreaks. Novel data are collected on Islamist organizations’ protests in Muslim-majority countries in 60-day periods pre- and post-outbreak of three wars involving Israel (Palestinian/Lebanese civilian fatalities>100). Using a difference-in-difference-in-difference design, multivariate OLS regression analysis demonstrates that pan-Islam, being a terrorist organization, and war outbreak timing interact to increase protests against Israel. Among non-terrorist Islamist organizations, compared to pre-war outbreak, domestic-oriented Islamist organizations observe a 6.9 percentage point increase in predicted percentage of protests against Israel. By contrast, pan-Islamist organizations observe a 16.0 percentage point increase, a 131.9 percent relative increase in predicted percentage of protests against Israel.
'Perceived Threat and Demographic Misperception', w/Jori Breslawski, in preparation
What causes demographic misperceptions of minority populations? We anticipate that the extent to which members of the majority group perceive the minority group as a threat shapes their estimation of minority group size. We test our argument using an experiment embedded in a survey of Muslims in Indonesia. We manipulate perceived threat of Christians in Indonesia and then ask respondents to estimate the size of the Christian population. While Muslims generally overestimate the size of the Christian population, we find that Muslims who felt a greater sense of threat estimated the Christian population to be significantly larger at both the national and provincial levels.
'Repression, backlash, and the duration of protests in Africa' w/Jacob Lewis, in preparation
This article investigates the relationship between recent repression of protest and the duration of future protests. A rich scholarship examines how repression impacts dissent, highlighting dissent dimensions such as the number of future events and violent escalation. Less examined is another dimension of dissent—protest duration. We hypothesize that recent repression of protests is pivotal for longer duration of future protest events. Our expectation stems from a participant type mechanism. Recent repression of protest may generate more societal grievances but also increase protesting risks. A simultaneous jump in grievances and risks may increase the number of people protesting who are also risk-acceptant and willing to protest for longer durations. The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project data and hierarchal negative binomial models are used to estimate the association between recent repression of protest and subsequent protest duration. Compared to having none of the most recent three protests repressed, a protest in a location where the last three protests were repressed has a 25% longer duration. The results are consistent with the participant type mechanism and existing literature on repression’s heterogeneous effects on individuals.
‘Within Self-Determination Movement Economic Inequality and Violence’, in preparation
Dual bargaining commonly characterizes a number of self-determination (SD) conflicts. Organizations making self-determination claims contest the state but also contest rival SD organizations. This article examines variation in SD organization violence against other SD organizations. It hypothesizes that (i) higher levels of ethnic population income inequality (WPI) are pivotal for explaining violence between SD organizations, and (ii) the relationship occurs at higher rates when the SD organization has previously used violence against the state. Survey-based data on WPI from 1992 to 2005 and SD organization violence demonstrate that higher WPI increases the probability of an SD organization using violence against other SD organizations. The association is driven by situations in which SD organizations previously used violence against the state. The findings are robust to secondary analysis at the ethnic group level, inclusion of additional covariates, sensitivity tests for omitted variable bias, various model specifications, subset analyses, matching techniques and tests for reverse causality. This article demonstrates that ethnic population inequality levels as well as SD organization interactions with the state may have meaningful consequences for violent behavior between SD organizations.
'Rebel Threat, Government Tactics, and Deaths from Hunger in Civil War' w/David Backer, Paul Huth and Peter White, in preparation
'When do Ethnic Groups Become Politically Disadvantaged? The Role of Contentious and Conventional Politics', in preparation